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Chs.
322 Amends § 7701 regarding special proceedings as to express
trusts.
342 Amends § 6218(b) to give the sheriff fifteen instead of ten
days to file his inventory in connection with an attachment.
347 Amends § 5236(c) to make certain changes in the time pro-
visions applicable to the publishing of notice in connection
with a sheriff's sale of realty.
349 Amends § 2105 to permit an attorney to certify papers only
if he is admitted to practice in New York.
388 This is a big bill submitted by the Judicial Conference. It
consists of mechanical corrections in the CPLR which were
overlooked at the 1963 session of the Legislature.
405 Amends § 6111 to wipe out the last vestige of the body
execution from New York practice. It provides that an
order of arrest after judgment is available only in an equity
action, and not in a law action (where an order of arrest
is allowed prior to judgment).
422 Amends § 2701 to insert a subdivision regarding court dis-
position of property which is in the possession of a party.
477 Amends § 408 to make it clear that disclosure in a surrogate
court, where most litigation consists of "proceedings," is not
to be governed by § 408, i.e., does not require a court order.
The usual notice procedures of Article 31 of the CPLR may
be used.
485 Amends § 5014(2) regarding when an action on a judgment
may be maintained.
511 Amends § 321(b) to require that other parties be notified
of a change of attorney.
519 Amends § 2302(a) to allow the attorney general to issue
subpoenas.
The Amendnent of CPLR Ride 3216- The 45-Day Demand
On April 24, 1964, the eve of the expiration of the 30-day
bill period, the Governor signed into law an amendment to rule
3216 which the plaintiffs' bar had been advocating for many months.
It is Chapter 974 of the Laws of 1964. The amendment is chiefly
the result of efforts by the New York State Association of Trial
Lawyers and the association's president, Herman B. Glaser, Esq.;
it was in great measure motivated by the impact of the Sortino
decision on the disposition of rule 3216 motions. The main sur-
vey article to which this list of amendments is appended treats the
Sortino case.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The amendment adds a paragraph to rule 3216, providing in
essence as follows. If the motion to dismiss for want of prosecu-
tion is predicated on the plaintiff's failure to file a note of issue
within six months after the joinder of issue, the rule 3216 motion
to dismiss does not lie and if the motion is made it must be denied.
The amendment so provides notwithstanding any time limitations
that may come from any other "law or rule;" that appears to be
aimed chiefly at the rules of the individual courts, precluding such
rules from interfering with the purpose of the amendment.
The foregoing is only the first part of the amendment. It
then goes on to require that, in any event, no rule 3216 motion
lies (and if made must be denied)
unless the defendant shall have served a written demand requiring the
plaintiff to serve and file such a note of issue and stating that the default
by the plaintiff in complying with such demand within forty-five days after
the service of such demand ...
If the plaintiff files the note of issue within the 45 days, no rule
3216 motion lies and, if the motion is made, it must be denied.
But where it is not served and filed within the 45 days -and
many a plaintiff may be confronted with obstacles in the circum-
stances of his particular case that will preclude the service and
filing-the situation reverts to exactly what it was prior to the
amendment. That is, the defendant may then make the rule'3216
motion and the factors that determine its disposition will be the
same as those that governed before the 1964 amendment to rule
3216. For that reason, the Bar should not lose sight of the
Sortino case or- assume that the amendment for some reason
overrules the case. It does not. The amendment merely precludes
the motion at certain times relative to the joinder of issue and the
defendant's making of a 45-day demand. The passing of those
time periods without the requisite action on the part of the plaintiff
enables the defendant to make his rule 3216 motion and requires
the court to dispose of it by the same criteria that have always
governed. Nothing in the amendment purports to change those
criteria, and the Sortino case is the principal exposition of them.
Indeed, the amendment even codifies the two basic showings that
plaintiff had to make under case law prior to the amendment in
order to defeat a rule 3216 motion: "justifiable excuse for delay
and a good and meritorious cause of action."
The plaintiff's bar has gotten a legislative reprieve. If a
plaintiff without good reason fails to perform the obligations im-
posed on him by the new rule, after the defendant has performed
his obligations under it, the plaintiff will have no standing to
blame the Sortino case for what is likely to follow.
One problem suggests itself. The amendment is effective Sep-
tember 1, 1964. Plaintiffs will be wondering what the results will
be prior to that date. Defendants, on the other hand, may flock
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to the courts with rule 3216 motions prior to September 1 in the
hope that the amendment will not be given any effect before that
time. It would appear, however, that we are dealing here with
what is generally characterized (whether accurately or not) as
"procedure." On strictly procedural matters, retroactivity is not
a constitutional problem. Matters as substantial as those involved
in the long-arm statute, Section 302 of the CPLR, have been
held retroactive. Section 10003 of the CPLR mandates the general
retroactivity of the entire CPLR. Though one may wonder whe-
ther that provision was intended to apply to amendments of the
CPLR, it would appear to furnish some ground for a judicial de-
termination that the rule 3216 amendment is retroactive. A
contrary indication appears, however, from the very fact that the
Legislature made the amendment effective September 1, 1964; it
could as readily have made it effective immediately if it particularly
considered that point.
The amendment represents a policy statement of the Legisla-
ture in which there appears to be no inherent factor that makes the
policy more important after September 1 than before. The effec-
tive date actually used should not be taken as automatic indication
of a legislative intent not to make the amendment retroactive. The
first of September is the traditional starting time for procedural
changes in our law. It may well be that it was used for the rule
3216 amendment more out of habit than deliberation. If so, the
policy specifically to be enforced after September 1 might be
given some impetus before then. The very presence of the amend-
ment makes it susceptible of implementation immediately, were the
courts so disposed. An early indication of such judicial attitude
would likely discourage the numerous rule 3216 motions that de-
fendants might be expected to make prior to September 1 to
avoid the 45-day demand provision of the amendment.
Legislative Amendments Other Than CPLR
The following chapters of the Laws of 1964 affect practice and
procedure in the courts. For the reasons previously specified, the
list is not exhaustive, though it contains the most significant pro-
cedural activities of the Legislature.
Chs.
200 Raises the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in first class
towns to $1,000.
204] Raises to $10,000 the monetary jurisdiction, respectively, of
243 the county courts of Saratoga, Franklin *and Suffolk
255J Counties.
230 Amends . 231(2) of the RPAPL to omit reference to § 5236
of the CPLR which reference caused serious difficulties to
